Reverse Engineering the Tapo C260 and Tapo Discovery Protocol v2

Thu, 01 Jan 2026 16:01:04 -0800

The Tapo C260 is the latest TP-Link camera featuring a whole host of upgrades. As part of the SPIRITCYBER contest where I found several RCEs and other interesting vulnerabilities, I decided to focus on this device and dive deeper into hardware hacking.

Earlier in 2025, I participated in the SPIRITCYBER IoT hardware hacking contest organised by the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore with YesWeHack. Among several devices, I found several RCEs and other interesting vulnerabilities that are still pending patches and CVE assignment.

One of the devices was TP-Link’s latest Tapo C260 camera, and while I do not plan to share any details of vulnerabilities yet (if there were any 😉), I want to share about the process of reverse engineering the firmware.

In addition, as part of my research I reverse-engineered the Tapo Discovery Protocol version 2. Version 1 has been thoroughly research and exploited by others before including at Pwn2Own, but since I couldn’t find any resources on the new version I thought it might be interesting to share.

In any case, I thought the C260 was a nice step up in difficulty from my previous ventures into the Nokia Beacon 1 and the LAU-G150-C Optical Network Terminal.

# Teardown 🔗

The C260 is a tough nut to crack, quite literally. It has a high-quality shell with no exposed screws - not even hidden under stickers or pads.

I found the iFixit Jimmy (they were actually giving them out for free at DEF CON) invaluable here in prying the case apart. There’s a bit of technique involved here - instead of trying to use it as a lever or cutter, first get part of the blade into the gap, then wobble it up and down so it slowly gets deeper into the gap. This creates a lot more leverage and room to maneuver.

After that, there are a few more screws and cases to pry open before getting to the juicy internals:

This is a fairly advanced camera with a multiple features like 4k camera, AI object recognition, microSD support, BT, and WiFi, with the components spread out across a few boards.

You may have noticed a `UART_TX` label in the first picture but they don’t work out of the box. Previous researchers of other Tapo devices typically had to reconnect these pins first to get them working.

More importantly, I located the flash memory - an ESMT F50L1G41LB chip in the WSON8 package (left side of first image).

# Static Analysis 🔗

The next step was to read it using the XGecu T48 programmer. Unfortunately, the provided WSON8 adapter for T48 was actually too small to fit the chip. To get around this, I used their alligator clip adapter (which fit the WSON8 pins) and connected it to the SOP8 adapter instead.

From there, it was fairly straightforward to read the chip as it was one of the supported devices for the T48. This time, I also made sure to remove the extra 64-byte OOB data as documented in the chip’s data sheet:

```
The device contains 1024 blocks, composed by 64 pages consisting in two NAND structures of 32 series connected Flash cells. Each page consists 2112-Byte and is further divided into a 2048-Byte data storage area with a separate 64-Byte spare area. The 64-Byte area is typically used for memory and error management.
```

Next was decrypting the filesystem - yes, Tapo devices do use filesystem encryption. Fortunately, a lot of work has already been done by Quentin Kaiser as detailed in his C200 blogpost (which also includes reconnecting the UART port), and the same hardcoded AES-128-CFB1 scheme and key are still in use!

Once I unpacked the Squash filesystem, I zoomed into the `/bin/main` binary, which contained most of the relevant handlers for web requests and other protocols.

As I’m saving some details for another blogpost on other parts of the C260 firmware, I’ll focus on the handler for Tapo Discovery Protocol.

## Tapo Discovery Protocol v2 🔗

The `main` binary has a lot of helpful logging messages that help identify the name of the function. In this case, I started in `tdpd_listen_thread` at offset `0x2a7e0`, which creates UDP sockets on port 20002 and 20010.

Next, the handler parses the incoming packet and helpfully logs the various struct values:

```
puVar8 = (undefined8 *) recvfrom(param_1,&DAT_00323530,0x1000,0,(sockaddr *)&DAT_00323310,&local_3c); if ((int)puVar8 < 1) { pcVar15 = "[TDPD]tdpd recv error."; uVar11 = 0x966; pcVar25 = "tdpd_handle"; LAB_0002a694: uVar18 = 3; goto LAB_00029c3c; } if ((int)puVar8 < 0x10) { bVar37 = 0x10; pcVar15 = "[TDPD]recvbuf length = %d, less than hdr\'s %d"; pcVar25 = "tdpd_handle"; uVar11 = 0x96c; LAB_0002a236: msg_debug(0,0x10,3,pcVar25,uVar11,pcVar15,puVar8,bVar37); return; } uVar20 = (uint)DAT_00323534; uVar21 = (uint)DAT_00323532; uVar22 = (uint)DAT_00323537; uVar23 = (uint)DAT_00323536; puVar39 = &DAT_00323540; uVar11 = _DAT_00323538; uVar38 = DAT_0032353c; msg_debug(0,0x10,1,"tdpd_handle",0x971, "[TDPD]recv packet:\nversion:%d\nreserved:%d\nflag:%d\nresult:%d\nopcode:%d\npayloadleng th:%d\nsn:%lu\nchecksum:%lu\npayload=%s\n" ,DAT_00323530,DAT_00323531,uVar23,uVar22,uVar21,uVar20,_DAT_00323538,DAT_0032353c, &DAT_00323540);
```

As can be seen in the final logging call, there’s a `version` value. It uses the version in an if/else statement further down that either uses the old handler for version 1 packets (which previous researchers have reverse-engineered), or a new set of handlers for version 2 packets via a switch statement:

```
switch(uVar28) { case 1: input_obj = jso_from_string(&DAT_00323540); if (input_obj == 0) { puVar32 = &DAT_00323540; msg_debug(0,0x10,3,"tdpd_build_discovery_app_packet",0x717, "[TDPD][Error] invalid json string = %s",&DAT_00323540,puVar14); jso_add_int(0,"error_code",0xffffffff); } else { out_root_obj = jso_new_obj(); if (out_root_obj == 0) { msg_debug(0,0x10,3,"tdpd_build_discovery_app_packet",0x720, "[TDPD][Error] failed to create out_root_obj",puVar32,puVar14); jso_add_int(0,"error_code",0xffffffff); jso_free_obj(input_obj); } else { result_obj = jso_new_obj(); if (result_obj == 0) { msg_debug(0,0x10,3,"tdpd_build_discovery_app_packet",0x728, "[TDPD][Error] failed to create result_obj"); jso_add_int(out_root_obj,"error_code",0xffffffff); LAB_0002a282: jso_free_obj(input_obj); iVar30 = jso_to_string(out_root_obj,&DAT_00324540,0xff0); if (iVar30 < 0) goto LAB_0002a48a; } else { iVar12 = tdpd_get_basic_info_v2(input_obj,result_obj);
```

In short, version 2 unlocks a lot more interesting functionality. I won’t dive into all the details here, but some of the interesting differences from version 1 are:

- Big-endian instead of little-endian
- CRC32 checksum instead of custom checksum
- A `tdpd_get_encrypt_info_v2` function that uses RSA encryption to send more comprehensive system data

# Emulating and Testing 🔗

While static analysis was helpful, I wanted to send real packets to a running camera. However, my rudimentary script failed. I knew I needed to have some sort of debugging set up to ensure I had correctly set the right struct sizes and values. There were two options - try to get UART access (and potentially encounter more blockers before getting a proper shell) or perform emulation.

Fortunately, with the entire filesystem, I could approximately emulate the running binary using Qiling framework. There were a few hurdles along the way, such as requiring some configuration values to be initiated. I intercept the `read_config` function using `ql.hook_address` and simply wrote to memory the missing values. Furthermore, since the `main` function executed several other handlers besides TDP, I manually redirected execution by changing the PC register to the address of the `tdpd_handle` function.

Next, I injected my generated TDP packet by hooking the `recvfrom` call.

Another final tweak I made was to modify the debug logging function to output to stdout (3) instead of null, allowing me to get the highly-informative logging messages and errors in my Qiling output.

```
PACKET = create_tdpd_packet(version=2, opcode=2, payload=OPCODE_2_PACKET) print(PACKET) def read_c_string(ql: Qiling, address: int, max_length: int = 256) -> str: raw_bytes = b"" for i in range(max_length): byte = ql.mem.read(address + i, 1) if byte == b'\x00': break raw_bytes += byte return raw_bytes.decode('utf-8', errors='ignore') # or 'ascii' def my_recvfrom(ql: Qiling, sockfd: int, buf: int, length: int, flags: int, addr: int, addrlen: int): ql.mem.write(buf, PACKET) return len(PACKET) def redirect_tdpd_handle(ql: Qiling) -> None: ql.arch.regs.lr = EXIT_ADDRESS ql.arch.regs.pc = 0x29728 | 1 # hook debug wrapper to also output to stdout def msg_debug_wrapper(ql: Qiling) -> None: ql.arch.regs.r2 = 3 def read_config_enter(ql: Qiling) -> None: config_key = read_c_string(ql, ql.arch.regs.r0) print(f'Reading config {config_key}') if config_key == '/cloud_config/extra_bind': ql.mem.write(ql.arch.regs.r1, b'data_collect') def read_config_exit(ql: Qiling) -> None: print(f'Value is {read_c_string(ql, ql.arch.regs.r5)}') def debug_tmp(ql: Qiling) -> None: print(read_c_string(ql, ql.arch.regs.r0)) print(read_c_string(ql, ql.arch.regs.r1)) EXIT_ADDRESS = 0x2ABC0 def main(): executable_path = 'squashfs-root/bin/main' rootfs_path = 'squashfs-root' ql = Qiling([executable_path], rootfs_path, archtype=QL_ARCH.ARM, ostype=QL_OS.LINUX, multithread=True)#, verbose=QL_VERBOSE.DEBUG) ql.os.set_syscall('recvfrom', my_recvfrom, QL_INTERCEPT.CALL) ql.hook_address(redirect_tdpd_handle, 0x1CB66) ql.hook_address(msg_debug_wrapper, 0x1C514) # read_config hooks ql.hook_address(read_config_enter, 0x134394) ql.hook_address(read_config_exit, 0x134444) ql.hook_address(read_config_exit, 0x1343B2) ql.hook_address(debug_tmp, 0x2B280) ql.run(end=EXIT_ADDRESS) if __name__ == "__main__": main()
```

Despite being held together with the code equivalent of duct tape and a prayer, it worked well enough that I could get a working generated packet on a running camera! I’ve shared the script on GitHub; do let me know if there are any corrections or improvements I can make.

## Conclusion 🔗

I’ve quickly coming to understand that reverse-engineering each new device comes with its own quirks and rabbit holes. While it might appear relatively straightforward in this post, I spent countless hours hunting down the right research, fighting with hardware, and stepping through broken code.

I found that AI-assisted RE was pretty helpful but not comprehensive enough for key details like structs, endianness, and so on. There’s been a lot of exciting developments recently focusing on plugging directly into disassemblers like AETHER with IDA Pro MCP that would certainly improve the user experience from simply plonking the pseudocode into Gemini.

As hinted in the beginning, I’m still not at liberty to share more details until I’m sure patches from SPIRITCYBER have been completed, but stay tuned for more exciting details!